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Stefan Carpenter*, Elizabeth Baldwin**, & Daniel H. Cole†

THE POLYCENTRIC TURN: A CASE STUDY OF
KENYA’S EVOLVING LEGAL REGIME FOR
IRRIGATION WATERS‡
ABSTRACT
Formal legal systems comprise a major part, but not the only
part, of the “rules of the game” that structure social and socialecological interactions. Throughout the twentieth century,
centralization and consolidation of legal authority were
dominant themes among many, if not all, legal systems. That
process may have been successful in some cases, but in others the
presumed economies of scale from consolidation and
centralization either did not materialize or were offset by other
social costs, including the failure to accommodate local
knowledge, expertise, and preferences. In what could become a
theme of the twenty-first century, many countries, including
developing countries, have started to experiment with more
polycentric legal systems, as the Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom
referred to them, where local users and user groups have a
substantial say in designing and administering rules that apply to
them.
This case study of Kenya amounts to a history of trial-and-error
in efforts to develop an effective legal regime to govern use of
irrigation water, in a country that has suffered for more than a
century from seasonal water scarcity, inefficient water use, and
user conflicts over water resources. From colonial efforts to
import British riparian law to complete centralization of legal
authority early in the post-colonial period, pressure on irrigation
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water resources and water users only increased. Beginning in
2003, however, the government of Kenya has been engaged in a
process that is not one of simple decentralization or devolution of
authority; rather, it is a story of increasing polycentricism, with
meaningful participation by local, regional, and national actors
in law-making and administration. The starting point actually
occurred in 1997, when local water users (advised by NGOs)
formed Kenya’s first Water User Association (WUA) to help
avoid and minimize local water-use conflicts. It worked so well
that the national government took notice. In 2003, Kenya’s
parliament enacted a brand new Water Act, which not only
legally recognized the existing WUA, but actively encouraged
and facilitated the creation of what the statute referred to as
Water Resources Users Associations (WRUAs). This move to
polycentricism appears to have reduced problems, including
conflicts, relating to periodic water shortages; and recently
drafted (but not yet adopted) legislative proposals would have
the effect of strengthening Kenya’s embrace of polycentric legal
control over irrigation water management.
INTRODUCTION
Although irrigated land comprises less than 2.5 percent of the world’s land
surface, irrigated agriculture nevertheless uses 70 percent of global water
withdrawals.1 Water scarcity already constrains agricultural production in many
parts of the world, and by 2050 the global population is expected to increase by
more than a third over its 2010 level.2 Even with efficiency improvements, total
agricultural demand for water is likely to increase, while at the same time climate
change and competing anthropogenic uses increasingly stress water resources.
Flexible and responsive governance of irrigation water is needed both to balance
competing demands and to provide resilience in the face of climatic uncertainty.
While serious, the challenge is not novel. Agriculturalists have long
encountered problems of water scarcity and competing uses and interests. Laws and
social norms have been crafted and amended in ongoing efforts to address these
problems. For much of the twentieth century, the dominant approach throughout
the world was to promulgate laws that consolidated and centralized water
governance.3 This centralizing tendency cut across ideological and geographic

1. S. Siebert el al., Development and Validation of the Global Map of Irrigation Areas, 9
HYDROLOGY AND EARTH SYS. SCI. DISCUSSIONS 535 (2005); Alessandro Flammini et al., Walking the
Nexus Talk: Assessing the Water-Energy-Food Nexus in the Context of the Sustainable Energy for All
Initiative (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Environmental & Natural Resources Management
Working Paper No. 58, 2014), http://www.fao.org/publications/card/en/c/f065f1d5-2dda-4df7-8df34defb5a098c8/ [https://perma.cc/QV3E-3XC7].
2. Attitudes About Aging: A Global Perspective, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.pewglobal.org/
2014/01/30/attitudes-about-aging-a-global-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/EY5M-4QJ6].
3. Krister P. Andersson & Elinor Ostrom, Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes from a
Polycentric Perspective, 41 POL’Y SCI. 71, 72 (2008).
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lines, occurring, for example, in post-colonial governments in Africa and India, the
United States, and the former Soviet Union.4
Yet, despite its relative ubiquity, centralized water governance often
proves to be a poor fit for ecological and socio-economic realities on the ground.
Centralized governance suffers from two significant shortcomings. First, it tends to
lack the responsiveness to address regional and/or seasonal variations in local
water availability and usage. Second, centralized governance generally proves to be
highly resource-intensive, both from an informational and enforcement standpoint.
As a consequence, centralized water governance often costs far more and delivers
far less than planned.5 Increasing recognition of the limits of centralized water
policy, combined with an adoption by the international financial community of a
more decentralized approach to the provision of public services, is contributing to a
global shift to more locally-based and, at times, polycentric approaches to water
governance.
Polycentricity can be loosely defined as an approach to governance in
which multiple, semi-autonomous centers of decision-making operate under a
common set of rules.6 Polycentric governance systems include a combination of
both “horizontal” and “vertical” polycentricity. While “horizontal” polycentricity
describes multiple, autonomous centers at the same level of governance, “vertical”
polycentricity describes shared authority across various levels of governance.
Polycentricity has been proposed as a potentially useful approach to water and
irrigation governance, where heterogeneous conditions within a country or region
suggest that no single set of rules could effectively govern resource use; instead, it
may be preferable to allow local communities to devise their own rules.7
Kenya exemplifies the challenges faced, and approaches taken, by many
countries in the governance of water for irrigation. While Kenya has a productive
agricultural sector, it experiences seasonal water scarcity, inefficient water use, and
user conflicts over water resources. In response to these challenges, for much of the
twentieth century, the Kenyan government increasingly centralized control over
water resources. Access to irrigation water required authority from central
government agencies, with little input from local actors. Consequently, centralized
control of irrigation proved ineffective at alleviating seasonal scarcity, inefficiency,

4. James S. Wunsch, Centralization and Development in Post-Independence Africa, in THE
FAILURE OF THE CENTRALIZED STATE: INST. AND SELF-GOVERNANCE IN AFR. 43 (James S. Wunsch &
Dele Olowu eds., 1990).
5. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, CRAFTING INSTITUTIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNING IRRIGATION
SYSTEMS (1992); Elinor Ostrom, The Challenge of Underperformance, in IMPROVING IRRIGATION
GOVERNANCE AND MGMT. IN NEPAL 3 (Ganesh P. Shivakoti & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2002).
6. Paul D. Aligica & Vlad Tarko, Polycentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom, and Beyond, 25
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y, ADMIN., AND INST. 237, 250 (2012).
7. See e.g., Andre R. da Silveira & Keith S. Richards, The Link Between Polycentrism and
Adaptive Capacity in River Basin Governance Systems: Insights from the River Rhine and the Zhujiang
(Pearl River) Basin, 103 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 319 (2013); Bruce Lankford &
Nick Hepworth, The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Monocentric and Polycentric River Basin Management,
3 WATER ALTS. 82 (2010); Ganesh P. Shivakoti & Ram C. Bastakoti, The Robustness of Montane
Irrigation Systems of Thailand in a Dynamic Human-Water Resources Interface, 2 J. OF INST’L ECON.
227 (2006); Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing
Irrigation Systems Can Work, 7 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 93 (1993).
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and water-use conflicts. Starting in 2003, the government of Kenya began
implementing a series of reforms that give local and regional actors greater ability
to participate in water allocation decisions. Among the most significant reforms
was the encouragement of local actors to create a new class of quasi-governmental,
quasi-civil society organizations8—Water Resource Users’ Associations
(WRUAs)—to take on some of the functions previously carried out by central
government agencies, such as allocating permits to divert water, apportioning water
during times of extreme scarcity, and resolving conflicts between water users.
Beyond the direct relevance to irrigation water governance, Kenya’s
reforms also provide a more generalizable example of the potential of local
adaptation and experimentation to respond to stakeholder needs and experiences.
For both logistical and political reasons, policymakers are constrained in their
ability to pass fully comprehensive legislation. From a logistical standpoint, it is
impossible for them to anticipate all scenarios to which a policy might apply. Those
tasked with “street-level” implementation of a policy inevitably encounter
circumstances about which a more or less general policy may be silent, or for
which the policy would be either ineffectual or counterproductive. From a political
standpoint, legislators may wish to shield themselves from political fallout arising
from the implementation of unpopular policy provisions. Consequently,
policymakers tend to enact legislation that serves as a general policy framework,
delegating to unelected bureaucrats the responsibility for filling in the details and
for making decisions on benefit or resource allocation. Such policy gaps (or
mismatches) create a space in which local government officials can adapt, within
limits, national policies to local conditions.
This article will examine the evolution over the past century of one aspect
of water governance in Kenya—the extraction of surface water for agricultural
use.9 Schematically, the article is divided into four sections. In the first section, we
briefly discuss the history of the dominant approaches to water governance since
the late 1800’s. In the second section, we explain the concept of polycentricity and
its potential relative advantages for water governance. In the third section, we
examine the evolution of Kenyan water law governing agricultural surface water
use. Kenya initially relied on the riparian doctrine, then on a highly centralized
governance regime, and finally on an increasingly polycentric approach to
governance. For each time period from 1890–2014, and for each major approach to
water allocation within each time period, this article identifies the main laws,
practices, and regulatory bodies that shape water allocation, monitoring, and
sanctioning, as well as the conditions impacting the ability of local water users and
other stakeholders to adapt Kenya’s water policy to local conditions. Because land
and water allocations often are closely linked, this section also briefly identifies

8. It should be noted that, while these WRUAs were a new phenomenon in Kenya, quasi-civil
society organizations have previously arisen and been discussed in other contexts. See, e.g., ALAN
PIFER, THE QUASI NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 3 (1967) (discussing the British QuasiNongovernmental Organizations commonly referred to as QUANGOs), http://eric.ed.gov/?id=
ED018846 [https://perma.cc/CSQ9-8FHV].
9. In many respects, the evolution of agricultural water law and governance approaches mirrors
that of other forms of water law and governance approaches. Nevertheless, given the complexity of this
area of law, we are restricting the scope of our analysis to only the agricultural use of surface water.
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relevant laws and norms regarding land allocation and use. The fourth and final
section of the paper discusses potential lessons for policy makers from Kenya’s
efforts to implement a polycentric water governance regime.
I. HISTORY OF WATER GOVERNANCE IN KENYA
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the consolidation and
centralization of control was by far the dominant approach to natural resource
management. Until the 1970s, central governments often centralized natural
resource governance as part of an attempt to increase industrial development.10 In
many countries, the consolidation began under colonial administration and was
continued by the post-independence governments.11 The urge to consolidate control
over resources was not limited to colonial countries, however, and included
countries at every stage of development and of every ideological persuasion.12
Because of its central role in agriculture, industrial development,
sanitation, and basic human survival, water might be even more susceptible to
centralized governance than many other natural resources. Central governments
have tended to dominate water governance for several reasons. First, domestic
intercommunity water disputes often require the intervention of national-level
agencies.13 To avert intercommunity conflicts, national-level agencies are
predisposed to create national-level governance regimes.14
Second, as noted above, natural resources are considered a basic
development tool, and developing countries often have viewed the development of
water resources as an important component in state building.15 For instance,
Mollinga and Bolding write that “[h]istorically, irrigation has been strongly
associated with state formation and state governance.”16 Similarly, large scale
projects such as dams and reservoirs are promoted, at least in part, as
representations of state power and hegemony.17
Finally, third parties such as the World Bank and other development
agencies traditionally encouraged state control in water governance through the
funding of large-scale development schemes.18 The World Bank’s approach rested
on a belief that a strong central government was necessary to ensure economic

10. Andersson & Ostrom, supra note 3.
11. Edward L. Webb, Forest Policy as a Changing Context in Asia, in DECENTRALIZATION,
FORESTS AND RURAL COMMUNITIES: POL’Y OUTCOMES IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 21, 25
(Edward L. Webb & Ganesh P. Shivakoti eds., 2008).
12. See generally JAMIE LINTON, WHAT IS WATER? THE HISTORY OF A MODERN ABSTRACTION
(2010); Webb, supra note 11, at 14.
13. See generally Eran Feitelson & Itay Fischhendler, Spaces of Water Governance: The Case of
Israel and Its Neighbors, 99 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 728, 730 (2009).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See generally THE POLITICS OF IRRIGATION REFORM: CONTESTED POLICY FORMULATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION IN ASIA, AFRICA & LATIN AMERICA 1 (Peter P. Mollinga & Alex Bolding eds.,
2004).
17. See Feitelson & Fischhendler, supra note 13, at 730–32.
18. Id. at 730.
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modernization in developing countries.19 Consequently, lending in third world
countries primarily consisted of funneling loans through central state institutions
for large infrastructure projects such as dams, irrigation schemes, and irrigation
mechanization.20
Beginning in the 1980s, the dominant paradigm of the World Bank and
other development agencies shifted from state-driven economic intervention to the
more market-oriented “Washington Consensus.”21 As outlined in the World Bank’s
“Berg Report,” this approach viewed developing countries’ economic problems as
resulting from distorting and irrational state institutions.22 Consequently, these
institutions began pressuring developing countries to adopt more market-based
approaches to natural resource governance, including water governance, and to
devolve state involvement to lower-level political units.23
II. POLYCENTRICITY
Polycentricity is a concept associated with the “Bloomington School” of
political economy, which refers to a political system in which multiple, semiautonomous decision centers possess overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions,
and operate under an agreed-upon overarching set of rules.24 Such polycentric
systems are distinguished from monocentric systems based on who is able to
determine and enforce rules.25 In a polycentric political system, many actors and
structures are afforded limited discretion to design and enforce rules, whereas, in a
monocentric system, a single decision structure has a monopoly over that process.26
Polycentric systems can, but do not necessarily, result in better
governance of natural resources. Multiple smaller-scale decision makers in a
polycentric system (as opposed to a single centralized decision maker under a
monocentric system) allow the users of a common-pool resource greater input into
its management.27 Users and other interested parties are, therefore, able to

19. See generally JEREMIAH I. DIBUA, MODERNIZATION AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT IN
AFRICA: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE 2–3 (2006); see also GRAHAM HARRISON, THE WORLD BANK AND
AFRICA: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GOVERNANCE STATES (2004).
20. HARRISON, supra note 19.
21. See generally ARUN AGRAWAL, CHARLA BRITT & KESHAV KANEL, DECENTRALIZATION IN
NEPAL: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999); DIBUA, supra note 19; THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE
AND POLICIES (Christopher L. Gilbert & David Vines eds., 2000); Thomas Perrault, State Restructuring
and the Scale Politics of Rural Water Governance in Bolivia, 37 ENV’T AND PLAN. A 263 (2005).
22. DIBUA, supra note 19, at 3, 35; THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES (Christopher L.
Gilbert & David Vines eds., 2000).
23. See DIBUA, supra note 19, at 2; THE WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES (Christopher L.
Gilbert & David Vines eds., 2000); Perrault, supra note 21.
24. Andersson & Ostrom, supra note 3, at 73; Michael D. McGinnis, Networks of Adjacent Action
Situations in Polycentric Governance, 39 POL. STUDIES. J. 51, 51 n.1 (2011).
25. Aligica & Tarko, supra note 6, at 245–46.
26. Id. at 245 (citing POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES: READINGS FROM THE
WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS (Michael D. McGinnis ed., 1999)).
27. ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 281–83 (2005);
Ahjond S. Garmestani & Melinda Harm Benson, A Framework for Resilience-based Governance of
Social-Ecological Systems, 18 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 9 (2013).
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incorporate local knowledge that might not be readily available to a centralized
authority.28
Polycentric systems may also foster policy experimentation and allow for
the rapid adoption of successful innovations. The creation of multiple centers of
power at different scales can provide opportunities for diverse citizens and lowerlevel officials to innovate.29 Failed experiments are less likely to adversely affect
the entire system in a polycentric political system, as the redundancy of
responsibilities allows for other centers to take over governance from a failed
center.30 But successful experiments can be rapidly diffused among other decision
centers.31
Polycentricity is not a panacea, however. Polycentric systems face
potential shortcomings. Smaller political entities may prove, in practice, to be more
risk adverse because they are less able to absorb the costs of failed experiments.
Consequently, rather than engaging in experimentation, the constituent decision
centers in a polycentric system may experience an ossification of policy design.32
Also, the creation of multiple decision centers increases the risks of inter-center
conflicts.33 Finally, in the case of natural resource governance, policymakers can
experience difficulty matching resource boundaries with the appropriate political
boundaries for individuals and institutions that benefit from and contribute to the
resource.34
Despite these potential shortcomings, polycentric governance systems
have had documented successes. In the 1970s, Elinor Ostrom and other researchers
famously compared the performance of polycentric (community) and monocentric
(consolidated) approaches to policing. Across a number of studies, the researchers
analyzed policing in the Nashville-Davidson County of Tennessee and cities of
Indianapolis, Chicago, Grand Rapids, and St. Louis. They compared the
performance of large, consolidated police forces with that of police forces that
continued to be operated by local jurisdictions along a number of dimensions,
including effectiveness, responsiveness, and citizen satisfaction. Ostrom and her
colleagues found that the smaller, locally operated forces consistently equaled or
outperformed their consolidated counterparts. Specifically, residents were more
satisfied with localized police services.35 These localized police forces were
equally effective36 and were better able to use officers’ personal knowledge and

28. OSTROM, supra note 27.
29. Elinor Ostrom, The Comparative Study of Public Economies, 61 THE AM. ECON. 91, 104
(1998).
30. OSTROM, supra note 27.
31. Id.
32. See generally Andersson & Ostrom, supra note 3.
33. Id.
34. Harini Nagendra & Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Governance of Multifunctional Forested
Landscapes, 6 INT’L J. OF THE COMMONS 104 (2012).
35. Elinor Ostrom, Roger B. Parks & Gordon P. Whitaker, Do We Really Want to Consolidate
Urban Police Forces? A Reappraisal of Some Old Assertions, 33 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 423, 428 (1973).
36. See Elinor Ostrom, Citizen Participation and Policing: What Do We Know, 7 J. OF VOLUNTARY
ACTION RES. 102, 107 (1978).
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improve resident satisfaction with police forces.37 In 2009, Elinor Ostrom wrote
that the researchers “never found a large police department with over 100 officers
able to outperform a small- to-medium-size department (25–50 officers) in
producing direct services including patrol, traffic control, response services, and
criminal investigations.”38
While the police studies are perhaps the most unambiguous findings in
support of polycentric systems, a number of studies suggest that polycentric
political systems can also result in effective management of natural resources. In
the 1960s, Elinor Ostrom examined efforts by southern California communities to
stem over-extraction from natural underground water reservoirs. Her study
involved a geographic region encompassing seven distinct, partially interconnected
underground reservoirs, all of which were being rapidly depleted to satisfy growing
water demands caused by increases in population and land usage.39 Compounding
growth-related demands for water were water-use laws that encouraged the
unfettered extraction of water as a means of establishing expropriation rights.40
Rather than relying on the creation of a single, centralized water authority, water
users in the region ultimately crafted a water governance system, through a process
of experimentation and conflict resolution, which included multiple limitedpurpose governmental entities, private companies, and voluntary user associations.
The roles and jurisdictions of these entities varied in both scale and purpose.41 Both
Ostrom42 and Blomquist43 note that this seemingly chaotic governing system has
had a remarkably high level of user compliance with water usage regulations, is
adaptable to changing circumstances, and has successfully and efficiently managed
water resources over a long period of time.
Polycentric systems have also had successes in forest and wildlife
management. For instance, after Nepal implemented community-managed forests
and leasehold forestry programs, including the creation of local forest user groups
tasked with a degree of local administrative and rulemaking authority, communitymanaged forests evidenced superior governance than did complete government

37. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom & Gordon Whitaker, Does Local Community Control of Police Make a
Difference? Some Preliminary Finding 17 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 48, 49 (1973) reprinted in
POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES 196 (Michael D. McGinnis ed., 2002); Bruce D.
Rogers & C. McCurdy Lipsey, Metropolitan Reform: Citizen Evaluations of Performances in NashvilleDavidson Country, Tennessee, 4 PUBLIUS: THE J. OF FED. 19, 32 (1974).
38. Peter J. Boettke, Jayme S. Lemke & Liya Palagashvili, Riding in Cars with Boys: Elinor
Ostrom’s Adventures with the Police, 9 J. OF INST. ECON. 407, 416 (2013) (quoting THE NOBEL
FOUNDATION, infra note 42).
39. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Elinor Ostrom – Biographical, THE NOBEL FOUNDATION, https://www.nobelprize.org/
nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/ostrom-bio.html [https://perma.cc/R3RP-HRXS].
43. See generally OSTROM, supra note 5. This study followed up on Elinor Ostrom’s original
research.
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control of the resource.44 Also, after gaining its independence in 1990, Namibia
implemented a more polycentric approach to wildlife conservation and, since that
time, has seen a significant increase in its wildlife populations.45
III. EVOLUTION OF KENYA WATER LAW
Overall, the historical path of Kenya’s water governance can be viewed as
winding from (a) a highly decentralized pre-colonial approach to (b) a pluralistic
approach reliant on a combination of British common law and pre-existing
traditional institutions to (c) an ever more centralized system of water permits and
government monitoring and enforcement before (d) adopting a more polycentric
approach to governance that seeks to involve local stakeholders in the governance
of water resources. This progression is, at heart, the result of a continual struggle
by the Kenyan governments (both colonial and post-independence) to develop the
country’s water laws and institutions to match its environmental and
socioeconomic realities.
A. Pre-centralization (Until 1900)
During pre-colonial and early colonial times, Kenyan agriculture was
dominated by pastoralism and subsistence agriculture. Cultivation was often semipermanent, allowing crop locations to shift based on availability of water and other
resources.46 Although no written accounts exist of indigenous water institutions
before the arrival of Europeans in the mid-1800s, considerable evidence indicates
that communities developed customary practices to govern water access, some of
which continue to govern water use in parts of Kenya.47 While these local
governance regimes had many common attributes, they nevertheless evolved in the
absence of any national water law, and were developed by the individual
communities to address their own particular social, political, and climatic
conditions.
Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya identify the following common traits among
the myriad indigenous water management regimes. The regimes tended to
recognize the communal ownership of water, with all individuals (and, in some
cases, animals) possessing the right to use the water for “primary” uses such as
personal domestic consumption or use on household gardens.48 Water rights were
44. Webb, supra note 11, at 30. See also Nagendra & Ostrom, supra note 34 (discussing studies by
Heinen and Shreshtha (2007) and Nagendra (2007) which evidence the success of a polycentric
approach to forest governance in certain regions in Nepal).
45. Stefan Carpenter, The Devolution of Conservation: Why CITES Must Embrace CommunityBased Resource Management, 2(1) ARIZ. J. OF ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 17 (2011).
46. L. WINSTON CONE & J. F. LIPSCOMB, THE HISTORY OF KENYA AGRICULTURE 42 (L. Winston
Cone & J. F. Lipscomb eds., 1972).
47. See David Nilsson & Ezekiel Nyangeri Nyanchaga, East African Water Regimes: The Case of
Kenya, in THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 105, 107 (Joseph W. Dellapenna &
Joyeeta Gupta eds. 2009); Victor Orindi & Chris Huggins, The Dynamic Relationship Between Property
Rights, Water Resource Management and Poverty in the Lake Victoria Basin, AFRICAN WATER LAWS:
PLURAL LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR RURAL WATER MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 33-1, 3 (2005).
48. Ruth Meinzen-Dick & Leticia Nkonya, Understanding Legal Pluralism in Water and Land
Rights: Lessons from African and Asia, in COMMUNITY-BASED WATER LAW AND WATER RESOURCE
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flexible, with access rights being negotiated and re-negotiated, in response to
scarcity or external pressures, at the individual and group levels.49
Communities likely organized maintenance of water sources, monitored
household water use, resolved disputes between users, and meted out social
sanctions for unauthorized use. For instance, the Marakwet Escarpment in Kenya’s
Kerio Valley contains extensive networks of “hill furrow” irrigation systems
designed to deliver river water onto the valley floor.50 While the exact age of these
networks is unknown, they certainly pre-date the arrival of colonists, and they
remain in use today in some areas of Africa.51 Large-scale maintenance or repairs
on the irrigation systems, where still in use, is traditionally initiated through the
blowing of a horn that has been passed down from generation to generation.52
Rights to water access are based on village and clan affiliation, with distribution of
those rights occurring after special meetings among representatives from the
affected villages.53 Punishments for theft of water are decided by a traditional body,
and can include both fines (in the form of livestock or money) and public shaming
and ridicule.54
Britain in the 1880’s had little interest in governing Kenya directly.
Rather, it desired only to establish an influence in the region in order to stop slave
trading, encourage trade and commerce, and protect its control of the Nile and
shipping routes to India via the Suez Canal.55 In 1888, Britain chartered the
Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) for the purpose of governing
current-day Kenya and Uganda.56 Of note, the charter mandated that IBEAC
respect local laws and customs:
In the administration of justice by the [IBEAC] to the peoples of
its territories or to any of the inhabitants thereof, careful regard
shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe

MANAGEMENT REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12, 16–17 (Barbara van Koppen, Mark Giordano
& John Butterworth eds., 2007).
49. Meinzen-Dick & Nkonya, supra note 48, at 16. This flexibility characterized the general
approach of indigenous African societies regarding land and resource use. Okoth-Ogendo writes, “no
particular type of man-land relationship (individual or communal) or particular attribute of sovereignty
could be said to describe accurately the tenure system of an African people. Man-land relationships
(what is here referred to as access) had always been specific to a function—cultivation, grazing, hunting
or firewood gathering. Thus, in any given community a number of people could hold a right or bundle of
rights expressing a specific range of functions.” H.W.O OKOTH-OGENDO, TENANTS OF THE CROWN:
EVOLUTION OF AGRARIAN LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN KENYA 17 (1991) (emphasis in original).
50. William M. Adams, Elizabeth E. Watson & Samuel K. Mutiso, Water, Rules, and Gender:
Water Rights in an Indigenous Irrigation System, Marakwet, Kenya, 28 DEV. & CHANGE 707, 711
(1997).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 715.
53. Id. at 717.
54. Id. at 725.
55. THE DEPENDENT EMPIRE AND IRELAND, 1840–1900: ADVANCE AND RETREAT IN
REPRESENTATIVE SELF-GOVERNMENT 596 (Frederick Madden & David Fieldhouse eds., 1991).
56. Charter to the Imperial British East Africa Company, 3 September 1888, in THE DEPENDENT
EMPIRE AND IRELAND, 1840–1900: ADVANCE AND RETREAT IN REPRESENTATIVE SELF-GOVERNMENT
616 (Frederick Madden & David Fieldhouse eds., 1991).
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or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with
respect to the possession, transfer, and disposition of lands and
goods, and testate or intestate succession thereto . . . and other
rights of property and personal rights.57
A mere two years later, however, Britain’s newly appointed Chancellor of
the Exchequer wrote to the Prime Minister, William Gladstone, complaining of
pressure for Britain to take over governance of the region: “the [IBEAC] have
‘thrown up the sponge’ (being as I imagine, insolvent) and a determined effort is
being made to force the British Government to take the damnosa haereditas.”58
Ultimately, geopolitical considerations (specifically, concerns that France and
Germany would step into any resulting power vacuum in the region) convinced
Britain to take over governing the area.59 Britain considered Uganda, with its fertile
soil and strategic location, to be of much greater importance than Kenya, but the
former was landlocked, and the only practical route to the sea lay through the
latter.60 Consequently, Britain declared modern-day Kenya (then known as British
East Africa) a protectorate in 1895.
Europeans in Kenya initially relied on English common law to establish
water rights amongst colons.61 In brief, the common law doctrine of riparian rights
(riparian doctrine) held that riparian property owners were entitled to (a) water that
was substantively unaltered in its quantity or quality, and (b) extract or use that
water in a manner that did not itself alter the quantity or quality of the water.62 The
doctrine held that downstream owners that had been damaged by upstream use
could seek damages in court. However, while colons may have relied on imported
British common law, Britain initially lacked any defined land policy in Kenya and,

57. Id. at 618.
58. Letter from Sir William Harcourt to William Gladstone (Sept. 20, 1892), in THE DEPENDENT
EMPIRE AND IRELAND, 1840–1900: ADVANCE AND RETREAT IN REPRESENTATIVE SELF-GOVERNMENT
619 (Frederick Madden & David Fieldhouse eds., 1991).
59. See Memorandum from Earl of Rosebery on Imperial British East Africa Company (Sept. 16,
1892) in THE DEPENDENT EMPIRE AND IRELAND, 1840–1900: ADVANCE AND RETREAT IN
REPRESENTATIVE SELF-GOVERNMENT 620 (Frederick Madden & David Fieldhouse eds., 1991) (noting
that, should England withdraw from East Africa, “other nations are anxious to obtain a footing on [the
Nile]”).
60. See Report from Sir Gerald Portal on Uganda (Nov. 1, 1893, in THE DEPENDENT EMPIRE AND
IRELAND, 1840–1900: ADVANCE AND RETREAT IN REPRESENTATIVE SELF-GOVERNMENT 624
(Frederick Madden & David Fieldhouse eds., 1991); Makau Kiamba, The Introduction and Evolution of
Private Landed Property in Kenya, 20 DEV. & CHANGE 121, 121 (1989).
61. Nilsson & Nyangeri, supra note 47, at 108 (noting that a colon is a colonial farmer or plantation
owner).
62. As described in the 1893 case John Young & Co. v. Bankier Distillery Co., 1893 A.C. 691, 698
(1893).
“A riparian proprietor is entitled to have the water of the stream . . . flow down as it
has been accustomed to flow down to his property, subject to the ordinary use . . . by
upper proprietors . . . and to such further use . . . on their part in connection with their
property as may be reasonable under the circumstances. Every riparian owner is thus
entitled to the water of his stream in its natural flow, without sensible diminution or
increase, and without sensible alteration in its character or quality. Any invasion of
this right causing actual damage . . . entitles the party injured to the intervention of the
Court.”
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as such, British involvement in Kenya (both directly and through the IBEAC) did
not seek to directly interfere with existing indigenous resource management.63
Thus, at the turn of the nineteenth Century, Kenyan water governance was
marked by a pluralistic, decentralized approach. Water use by colons relied on the
court system to apply common law and fashion ex post remedies. Throughout the
remainder of Kenya, water governance consisted of a multitude of traditional
institutions.
B. Consolidation of Governance by the Colonial State (1900-1963)
At the turn of the twentieth century, the colonial government began to take
steps to actively control water usage, rather than relying on the application of
common law through the judicial system. The common law was seen as being
particularly ill-suited for water management in Kenya, and the next eight decades
saw repeated attempts to restrict water extraction and use through the issuance of
licenses and the adoption of increasingly strict legislation and rules. Coincident
with this increased involvement in colon water usage, the government also asserted
its hegemony over Kenya’s native areas. In the process, the government overrode
or subordinated many indigenous water management institutions.
1. 1900–1909
In 1902, the government passed the Crown Lands Ordinance, which
provided that land conveyed to settlers under the ordinance did not confer any right
to the waters of any river or lake.64 Later that year, the government issued the Rules
for Purchase of Land under the Crown Lands Ordinance (the “1902 Rules”) which
prohibited the interference with or diverting of any stream or body of water that
extended beyond the limit of a single landholding without permission.65 The 1902
Rules also stated that the use of all lands purchased from the Crown would be
subject to the issuance of future irrigation rules.
At the same time that the colonial government began consolidating control
over Kenya’s water management, it also initiated a series of actions that
consolidated control over black Kenyans, in the process significantly eroding their
traditional autonomy over their lands and water resources. Much of this erosion
was due to economic interests. In late 1901, Britain finished construction of a
railroad from Kenya’s coast into Uganda at a cost of ₤5,000,000.66 Kenya’s

63. Kiamba, supra note 60, at 125; CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46, at 27; M. P. K. SORRENSON,
ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN KENYA (1968) (“British administration had come to East Africa
in name though it would still be years before it was present in reality”). Of course, the colonial
expropriation of land and resources may well have had a significant impact on the functioning of preexisting water governance regimes. Nevertheless, during this period, Britain did not make any formal
legal attempts to undermine the functioning of the indigenous regimes.
64. The East Africa Protectorate Crown Lands Ordinance (Sept. 27, 1902) reprinted in 95 BRITISH
AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1901–02, at 528 (1905).
65. Rules for the Purchase of Land under the Crown Lands Ordinance 1902, No. 76 (1903) THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE EAST AFRICA AND UGANDA PROTECTORATES (East Africa Protectorate).
66. Memorandum from Sir Charles Eliot on the Protectorate (June 10, 1901), in THE DEPENDENT
EMPIRE AND IRELAND, 1840–1900: ADVANCE AND RETREAT IN REPRESENTATIVE SELF-GOVERNMENT
634 (Frederick Madden & David Fieldhouse eds., 1991); CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46, at 32.
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Commissioner67 at the time called for increased settlement by Europeans of fertile
lands in the Rift Valley and Mau Highlands in order to recoup the costs of
constructing and operating the railway.68 Britain answered this call by issuing a
series of acts and orders-in-council.69
The 1901 East Africa (Lands) Order-in-Council granted the Commissioner
the ability to alienate “Crown lands,” which were defined as “all public lands
within the East African Protectorate which for the time being are subject to the
control of his Majesty . . . and all lands which have been or may hereafter be
acquired. . . . “70 Though the order-in-council did not define the phrase “public
lands,” Kenya’s Commissioner interpreted it to apply only to “wastelands.”71 The
next year, the Commissioner issued the Crown Lands Ordinance, which provided,
inter alia, that the rights of native Africans in land only applied to land under actual
occupation, and that the Commissioner could sell or lease “waste and unoccupied”
lands without seeking the consent of any indigenous authority.72 Land that was not
actively occupied by a native Kenyan was considered to be wasteland, and thereby
part of the Crown lands.73 This designation, however, failed to take into account the
fact that native Kenyans often traditionally retained ownership interests in lands
that they were fallowing, and that many pastoralists had traditional territories which
were used seasonally or episodically.74
2. 1910–1919
A little more than a decade later, the colonial government returned its
attention to the issue of water use. In 1915, the colonial government repealed the
1902 Crown Lands Ordinance, and issued a new ordinance by the same name. Like
its predecessor, the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance provided that a conveyance of

67. Between 1895 and 1905, the country’s top political appointees were referred to as
“Commissioners.” From 1905 until independence, they were referred to as “Governors.”
68. Eliot, supra note 66, at 635; CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46, at 27; J. K. Matheson, White
Settlement, in EAST AFRICAN AGRICULTURE: A SHORT SURVEY OF THE AGRICULTURE OF KENYA,
UGANDA, TANGANYIKA, AND ZANZIBAR, AND OF ITS PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS 13, 18 (J.K. Matheson &
E.W. Bovill eds., 1950).
69. As explained by the 1910–1911 Encyc. Britannica, there were two classes of orders-in-council.
The first consisted of orders issued by the British sovereign on the advice of the privy council. They
differed from statutes in that they did not require the approval of Parliament, but the encyclopedia noted
that, at the time of its publication, “the principle seems generally accepted that orders in council may be
issued on the strength of the royal prerogative, but they must not seriously alter the law of the land.” The
second class were orders issued by administrative departments of the government pursuant to authority
granted by an act of Parliament. Order in Council, THE ENCYC. BRITANNICA: A DICTIONARY OF ARTS,
SCIENCES, LITERATURE AND GENERAL INFORMATION 187 (11th ed. 1910–1911).
70. East Africa Lands Order in Council (Aug. 8, 1901), reprinted in 95 BRITISH AND FOREIGN
STATE PAPERS 1901–02, at 999 (1905). Prior to this order-in-council, the Commissioner had been
restricted to only alienating land located within Kenya’s “railway zone.” See Kiamba, supra note 60, at
126.
71. Tim O.A. Mweseli, The Centrality of Land in Kenya: Historical Background and Legal
Perspective, in ESSAYS ON LAND LAW: THE REFORM DEBATE IN KENYA 3, 8 (Smokin C. Wanjala ed.,
2000).
72. Id. at 8–9.
73. CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46, at 53.
74. Matheson, supra note 68, at 18.
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land under the ordinance did not convey any right to water, and prohibited the
damming of the water of a spring, river, lake, or stream. But, in a de facto
continuation of the riparian doctrine the ordinance provided an express use
exception for “domestic purposes.”75 Curiously, the ordinance did not define what
qualified as a “domestic purpose.” Violation of the 1915 Crown Land Ordinance’s
water restrictions was punishable by a fine not exceeding £150.
In 1916, at bequest of the Kenyan government, the Director of the Public
Works Department proposed the Draft Water Ordinance of 1916.76 That draft
proposed the “state ownership and control supreme, not only of all rivers and lakes
but also of their beds and banks.”77 It also called for an end to the reliance on the
courts for resolutions over water disputes.78 The draft ordinance was not ultimately
adopted, but the Governor-in-Council did issue the Crown Lands (Water Permit)
Rules of 1919, which represented the colony’s first set of rules specifically
addressing water use.79 While the rules did not provide any specific restrictions on
water usage, they did allow for the possibility of water use permits. The rules stated
that all subsequent water licenses and permits issued by the Director of Public
Works (who the rules designated as the “prescribed officer” under the 1915 Crown
Lands Ordinance) would be deemed to be of full force and effect as if they were set
forth in the Rules themselves.
3. 1920–1940
The Kenyan Parliament episodically grappled with the issue of water
usage throughout the next two decades. This time period also witnessed continued
efforts by the colonial government to subordinate traditional water governance
institutions.
a. Legislation Impacting Native Kenyans
The Kenya (Annexation) Order in Council, 1920 (the “Annexation
Order”) included in “His Majesty’s Dominions” all territories within the East
Africa Protectorate except for those territories contained within the Sultanate of
Zanzibar.80 Because it did not contain any exemptions for native reserves, the
Annexation Order had the effect of categorizing those lands as Crown Lands.81 A
year later, the Kenya Colony Order in Council, 1921 (the “1921 Order”) officially
included lands occupied by native Kenyans as Crown Lands, defining the latter as
including “all lands occupied by the native tribes of the Colony and all lands
reserved for the use of the members of native tribes.”82 The Annexation Order and
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Crown Lands Ordinance (1915) Cap. 140 § 75.
Nilsson & Nyanchaga, supra note 47, at 110.
Id.
Id.
The Crown Lands Ordinance, 1915, No. 677 (1919) THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE EAST
AFRICA PROTECTORATE.
80. The Kenya Annexation Order in Council (June 11, 1920), reprinted in 113 BRITISH AND
FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1920 at 74–75 (1923).
81. CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46, at 76.
82. The Kenya Order in Council (Jun. 27, 1921), reprinted in 117 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 1923, at 1–2 (1926)
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the 1921 Order stripped native Kenyans of virtually all of their rights in their land.
The Kenyan Supreme Court recognized as much in a 1921 ruling when it
determined that “all native rights . . . [had] disappeared and natives in the
occupation of such Crown land became tenants-at-will of the Crown of the land
actually occupied. . . . “83
In 1923, the British Parliament passed the Devonshire Declaration, in
which the British Parliament formally declared that the Kenyan colonial
government regarded itself as exercising a trust on behalf of native Kenyans. 84 The
British government designated reserved lands as being held in trust due, at least in
part, to a desire to protect black African interests in the region while reigning in
European settlers’ attempts at self-government.85 Nevertheless, these developments
legally established that the Crown, rather than native Kenyans, would be
responsible for owning land and managing affairs on behalf of native
populations—the effect of which was to undermine the role of traditional African
institutions.86
Concurrent with this diminishment of traditional land ownership rights,
the early 1920s also witnessed an increased effort by the Kenyan government to
increase the productivity of native agriculture. The Department of Agriculture’s
Annual Report for 1920 described the native reserves as being “highly fertile,” and
stressed that it was “essential” that residents of those reserves “utilize profitably”
their lands. 87 The 1923 Devonshire Declaration stated Parliament’s intent to
increase the economic productivity of native Kenyans in order to help them achieve
a “higher intellectual, moral and economic level.”88 The 1925 Report of the East
Africa Commission, which summarized the export of crop production in Kenya for
the years 1921–1924, also emphasized the need to devote more resources to
increasing agricultural and pastoral output from lands occupied by native Kenyans,
stressing the potential for a rapid increase in agricultural production within the
native reserves.89 Finally, in 1927, the Chief Native Commissioner issued a circular
to all Kenyan administrative officers entitled The Dual Policy of Development that
demanded better agricultural output within the native reserves in order to meet the
reserves’ increased food demands.90 By the 1930s, the colonial government had
established a Ministry of Agriculture to promote market-based agricultural

83. Isaka Wainaina wa Gathomo v. Murito wa Indangara (1921) 9 L.R.K. 102, 104 (Kenya).
84. CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46, at 57.
85. See generally Daniel M. Stephen, ‘Brothers of the Empire?’ India and the British Empire
Exhibition of 1924–25, 22 TWENTIETH CENTURY BRIT. HIST. 164 (2011).
86. The Devonshire declaration placed formal control over native Kenyan lands and resources in
the hands of the colonial government. See generally Ezekiel Nyangeri Nyanchaga, Historical Timeline
on Water Governance in Kenya (1895–2002), in GOVERNANCE IN WATER SECTOR—COMPARING DEV.
IN KENYA, NEPAL, S. AFR. AND FIN. 18, 21 (2007). As a practical matter, it also enabled the colonial
government’s expanded efforts at boosting agricultural productivity among native Kenyans, described
infra in notes 88–91.
87. CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46, at 43.
88. Id. at 57.
89. SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, REPORT OF THE EAST AFRICA COMMISSION 155–58
(1925) (U.K.).
90. See CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46, at 65-66.
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techniques, and a Betterment Fund to finance irrigation projects, administered by
the Native Lands Trust Board.91
b. Legislation Impacting Water Usage by Both Colons and Native Kenyans
In 1921, the Kenyan National Assembly considered but abandoned a new
draft water ordinance after determining that the cost to implement it would be
prohibitive.92 In 1926, the Director of Kenya’s Public Works Department, H.L.
Sires, issued a commissioned report containing recommendations regarding
Kenya’s future water policy.93 Comparing water laws from a number of European
countries and former and then-current British colonies, the report determined that a
reliance on common law riparianism prevented the efficient use of water resources
because the resulting tenure insecurity inhibited development of the resource.94 As
a remedy, the report recommended that the Kenyan state claim ownership and
control over its water resources.95 Also in 1926, A.D. Lewis, the Director of
Irrigation for South Africa, independently assessed Kenya’s water governance.96
Like Sires, he also determined that a common law approach was inappropriate for
the governance of Kenya’s water.97
At Lewis’ recommendation, Kenya created a Water Legislation
Committee, which subsequently produced a draft water bill for consideration in
1928 (the “1928 Draft Water Bill”).98 Among other things, the 1928 Draft Water
Bill proposed to nationalize ownership of all sources of water, including
subterranean water, on crown lands.99 In support of the proposed bill, Sires argued
that the need for a new ordinance had been recognized “for many years by those
who have been concerned with the administration of existing water law.”100 He
emphasized that achieving the “maximum beneficial use” of water was a matter of
“national importance” in light of the fact that Kenya’s water resources were “all too
scanty and inadequate” for the full development of the country.101
Strong opposition by white farmers prevented the passage of the 1928
Draft Water Bill, and Kenya instead passed a weakened water bill in 1929 (the
“1929 Water Ordinance”).102 The 1929 Water Bill contained no language regarding
ownership of subterranean waters, but it did provide for state ownership of all
91. Id.
92. 2 KENYA NAT’L ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL REC. 594 (1929) (legislative debate on the 1928 Water
Bill).
93. Nilsson & Nyanchaga, supra note 47, at 110. The authors refer to Sires as “Sikes.” However,
since the Legislative Council Debates, 1928 Vol. II refers to the Director of Public Works as “Sires,”
that name will be used herein.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 2 KENYA NAT’L ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL REC. 594–95 (1929) (statement of Mr. Sires).
97. Nilsson & Nyanchaga, supra note 47, at 110.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 111.
100. 2 KENYA NAT’L ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL REC. 594 (1929) (statement of Mr. Sires).
101. Id. at 597.
102. Nilsson & Nyanchaga, supra note 47, at 111; An Ordinance to make Provision for the
Employment and Conservation of Waters and to Regulate Water Supply, Irrigation, and Drainage, No.
35 (1929) OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE COLONY AND PROTECTORATE OF KENYA No. 68.
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surface waters, and delegated its management to the Water Board, a government
body created expressly for that purpose.103 The 1929 Water Bill retained some
elements of riparianism in that it allowed for domestic uses of water without the
need for a permit. Nevertheless, the Bill also tasked the Board with protecting
downstream users—a role that had previously been reserved for the courts under
British common law.104
Kenya’s status as a British colony meant that the 1929 Water Bill required
the assent of the King before it could take legal effect. In July 1930, however, the
Secretary of the State informed Kenya’s colonial leaders that he could not
recommend such assent, voicing concerns that it did not sufficiently protect the
interests of residents on the native reserves.105 In response to this concern, and
consistent with the Annexation Order and 1921 Order, in 1934 Kenya’s Lands
Commission determined that all native reserves would be brought within the
jurisdiction of the Water Board, which would be considered as the riparian owner
of those territories and trustee for Africans living on the reserves.106 Based on this
interpretation, the 1929 Water Bill received the assent of the British Crown and
entered into effect on July 1, 1935.107 In a corresponding notification in the Kenya
Gazette, the Kenyan government described the primary object of the 1929 Water
Bill as being to conserve water and maximize its use.108 The notification also
observed that, as of June 25, 1935, more than 1,000 water permits had been issued
(not including yearly permits).109
4. 1941–1963
a. Continued Amendment of Water Law to Centralize Governance
In 1941, six years after the 1929 Water Bill entered into effect, the
colonial government again felt compelled to address the issue of water use and
formed the Land and Water Conservation Committee. That Committee was tasked
with coordinating “in an advisory capacity, with a view to the more effective
conservation of the water . . . of Kenya, the efforts of the various authorities
empowered . . . to deal with the natural resources of the Colony and the
Protectorate.”110 Then, in 1943, the Kenyan government passed the Land and Water
Preservation Ordinance. While largely concerned with soil erosion and land use, it

103. Nilsson & Nyanchaga, supra note 47, at 111.
104. An Ordinance to make Provision for the Employment and Conservation of Waters and to
Regulate Water Supply, Irrigation, and Drainage, No. 35 (1929) OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE COLONY
AND PROTECTORATE OF KENYA No. 68.
105. Id.
106. Nilsson & Nyanchaga, supra note 47, at 111. The Native Lands Ordinance, 1938, formally
recognized the Native Trust Board as being the landholder for native lands for purposes of the 1929
Water Ordinance.
107. Nilsson & Nyanchaga, supra 47, at 111.
108. The Water Ordinance, 1929, General Notice No. 816 (1935) OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE
COLONY AND PROTECTORATE OF KENYA No. 32.
109. Id.
110. Government Notice No. 521 (1941) OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE COLONY AND PROTECTORATE
OF KENYA No. 25.
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did allow the Governor in Council to make rules for the maintenance of water
located within a body of water.111
After the conclusion of the Second World War, the Kenyan state increased
its involvement in water governance, including the allocation of £1.2 million over
ten years towards water development.112 State-sponsored activity on the Native
Reserves also increased rapidly in the 1950s, after the Agricultural Department
commissioned a comprehensive Five Year Plan to increase native Kenyans’
agricultural productivity.113 Many of these activities involved small-scale
community projects, in which government-funded dams, boreholes, or wells
provided irrigation to communities.
At the same time it increased its role in the development of water
infrastructure, the colonial government sought to further consolidate its control
over the resource. Motivated by the desire to facilitate the “investigation,
conservation, and proper use of water resources,”114 the Kenyan Parliament
adopted the Water Ordinance in 1951 (the “1951 Water Ordinance”). Whereas the
1929 Water Ordinance was primarily concerned with the ownership of surface
water rights and the removal of the court system as the primary arbiter of water
disputes, the 1951 Water Ordinance, as amended, centralized control over water
use and designed an entirely new set of institutions to structure and oversee water
governance and disputes:






The Ordinance reaffirmed Crown ownership of all bodies of water in
Kenya (including groundwater), and the fact that control over those
resources was vested in the Minister responsible for water resources (the
“Minister”). Additionally, the Ordinance added an affirmative duty by the
Minister to “promote the investigation, conservation, and proper use
throughout Kenya of the water supplies in Kenya, and to secure
throughout Kenya effective exercise by any authority or person under the
control of the Minister of their powers and duties in relation to water.”
The Ordinance conferred emergency powers on the Minister such that,
when there was an unforeseen or threatened “serious deficiency” in water
available for domestic purposes, the Minister could order users with
excess water to share that excess with other users, and could recover
payment from the beneficiaries for that provision.
The Ordinance established a Water Resources Authority (WRA), which
consisted of twelve members: one representative of the Minister, an

111. The Kenyan Parliament repealed the Land and Water Preservation Ordinance when it adopted
the Agriculture Act in 1955. However, the Agriculture Act preserved any rules and orders issued under
the Land and Water Preservation Ordinance, except to the extent that they were in conflict with any
provisions therein. See Agriculture Act (1962) Cap. 318 § 7 (Kenya) (Loose-leaf in 11 vols. with
updates filed through the supplement of 1976).
112. Nilsson & Nyangeri, supra note 47, at 112.
113. CONE & LIPSCOMB, supra note 46; see generally R.J.M. SWYNNERTON, A PLAN TO INTENSIFY
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN AGRICULTURE IN KENYA (1955).
114. A Bill to Make Better Provision for the Conservation, Control and Use of the Water Resources
in the Colony and for Purposes Incidental Thereto, No. 396 (1949) OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE COLONY
AND PROTECTORATE OF KENYA No. 18.
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officer of the Ministry responsible for local government, four public
officers, and six non-public officers. The WRA duties included: (1)
investigating Kenyan water resources and making recommendations
regarding its management, (2) surveying existing consumption of and
demand for water, and (3) estimating and proposing plans to meet future
water requirements.
The Ordinance also established a Water Apportionment Board (WAB),
which was subordinate to the WRA. One of the powers allocated to the
WAB was the ability, during a drought or with regard to small
watercourses, to require that water users allow an equitable amount of
water to pass to other users or to prohibit certain activities deemed to be
inequitable (even if doing so overrode a pre-existing permit).
The Ordinance also divided Kenya into drainage areas as determined by
the Water Apportionment Board. The Minister could appoint a Regional
Water Board (RWB) for each of these drainage areas. The RWBs were
tasked with advising the WRA regarding water demand, usage, and
planning in their respective drainage areas.115

Adopted to implement the 1951 Water Ordinance, the 1953 Water
(General) Rules116 (the “1953 Water Rules”), as amended, granted the WAB the
authority to assign a water bailiff to govern extraction from a body of water when it
appeared that the water was not being or was not likely to be divided in accordance
with the rights of the users. Water bailiffs were authorized to apportion and
regulate the usage of water, and also to shut or regulate any works used in
connection with that water. The 1953 Water Rules also expressly prohibited the
extraction of more water than could be immediately put to beneficial use.
Regarding state sponsored projects in the native reserves, the colonial
government generally allowed native Kenyans to allocate water amongst users
according to traditional practices.117 Nevertheless, residents of the native reserves
were still expected to comply with Kenya’s newly enacted water laws. Further, the
1953 Water Rules required residents of native reserves to obtain “Community
(Reserve Areas) Permits” in order to legally extract water located on or running
through the reserves.118 Form No. W.A.B. 13, appended to the 1951 Water
Ordinance, limited permits for domestic water extraction for Africans (as opposed
to Europeans or Asians) to ten gallons/day (a rate that was five times less than that
allocated to non-Africans).
In 1955, the East Africa Royal Commission promulgated a report (the
“EARC Report”) that recommended actions designed to facilitate/address a wide

115. The Water Act (1972) Cap. 372 § 24 (Kenya).
116. 1953 Water Rules (1962) Cap. 372 § 3 (Kenya) (Looseleaf in 11 vols. with updates filed
through the supplement of 1976).
117. See, e.g., Chris Huggins, Water Policy and Law in a Water-Scarce Country: Implications for
Smallholder Irrigation in Kenya, in THE CHANGING FACE OF IRRIGATION IN KENYA: OPPORTUNITIES
FOR ANTICIPATING CHANGES IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 277, 279 (Herbert G. Blank, Clifford
M. Mutero & Hammond Murray-Rust eds., 2002).
118. 1953 Water Rules (1962) Cap. 372 § 3 (Kenya)
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range of goals and perceived problems in the East African region.119 With regards
to water development, the EARC Report recommendations proposed the creation
of a separate water department, entirely devoted to rural water use, which would be
responsible to the Minister concerned with land use for rural water development.120
This proposed water department was to be divided into two sections: one devoted
exclusively to irrigation and the other to general water usage.121 In a response to the
EARC Report, the Governor of Kenya wrote that the implementation of this
recommendation would be deferred for further consideration.122
By the time Kenya gained its independence, the central government had
assumed control over almost all of rural water management.123 While the native
reserves were still allowed to govern their internal water usage, this ability was—at
least from a de jure standpoint—constrained by the requirement that the reserves as
a whole had to obtain community permits. And, given the incredibly low amount of
water granted for native Kenyans, as opposed to their non-African counterparts, the
governance may have consisted of little more than distributive triage.
b. Creation of Large-Scale Irrigation Schemes
At the same time that the colonial government was consolidating its legal
control over agricultural water use, it also extended its reach by creating large-scale
irrigation schemes. After the end of World War II, the colonial government began
resettling native Kenyans, at times involuntarily, to serve as tenant farmers on
government run agricultural development projects. These projects controlled nearly
all agricultural decisions of their tenants. Managers appointed by the colonial
government determined what crops would be grown, how they would be grown,
and where they would be sold.124 With decision-making completely centralized,
tenants had little to no capacity to adapt their behaviors to respond to changes in
market or meteorological conditions.125
The creation of the agricultural projects was driven primarily by three
interrelated concerns: soil depletion and erosion resulting from improper farming
practices, increasing rural populations, and the desire to increase the government’s
control over residents deemed to be a threat to Kenya’s stability. Colons and the
state claimed large swaths of land, which, together with an increase in the
population of rural black Kenyans, placed demands on land use that disrupted the

119. Andrew James Hood, Developing the East African: The East Africa Royal Commission, 1953–
1955, and its Critics (May, 1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University),
http://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/19169/9727564.PDF?sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/EC4S-RRYB].
120. Dispatches from the Governor of Kenya (1962) Cap. 13 § 45 (Kenya) (Loose leaf in 11 vols.
with updates filed through the supplement of 1976).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Nilsson & Nyangeri, supra note 47, at 113.
124. Elizabeth Baldwin et al., Polycentric Governance and Irrigation Reform in Kenya, 29
GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF POL’Y, ADMIN., AND INST. 207, 212–215 (2016).
125. Id. at 215
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traditional practice of periodically fallowing land.126 The decrease in fallowing led,
in turn, to a decline in soil productivity and an increase in soil erosion.127 By the
late 1930’s administrators throughout Africa recognized soil infertility and erosion
as serious problems, and population resettlement as a potential solution.128 In 1938,
for example, concern over the infertile soils of land occupied by the Mbere tribe led
one official to write that the tribe’s only hope for economic success was
resettlement to better lands.129
With the cessation of hostilities at the end of World War II, the United
Kingdom significantly increasing funding for colonial development, resulting in
renewed interest in resettlement schemes in the late 1940’s.130 Chambers writes,
“European settlement had reduced the land available for African use, exacerbating
overpopulation problems and at the same time creating a political situation in
which African expansion was regarded as a threat to security. . . . Irrigation in
Kenya was . . . designed to have a stabilizing effect.”131 The 1952 Mau Mau
rebellion led the colonial state to forcibly relocate large numbers of Kikuyu tribe
members who previously had lived in the European Settled Area onto the
designated Kikuyu land.132 Kikuyu detainees were used to construct three large
irrigation settlements.133 Mwea was one of them, and was also Kenya’s largest
irrigation scheme. Kikuyu detainees considered to be security risks were settled
there.134
The irrigation schemes initially were administered through a relatively
loose coalition of governmental agencies. By 1954, a Joint Irrigation Committee
was created to facilitate national level coordination, while local committees
operated at the scheme level.135 But “[t]hese were not statutory bodies, and their
effectiveness . . . depended to a considerable extent on the personalities and cooperation of those who took part.”136 In 1960, the Ministry of Agriculture assumed
primary responsibility for operating the schemes.137 Nevertheless, and despite the
uniformity of formal policies and statutes, in practice the schemes’ managers
operated with a large degree of autonomy in implementing and interpreting each
scheme’s irrigation rules, with little meaningful input from the schemes’ tenant
farmers.138

126. ROBERT CHAMBERS, SETTLEMENT SCHEMES IN TROPICAL AFRICA: A STUDY OF
ORGANIZATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 20 (1969).
127. Id. at 20–21.
128. Id. at 21–22.
129. Id. at 22.
130. Id. at 23.
131. Id. at 24–25.
132. Id. at 58.
133. Id. at 25.
134. Id.
135. E.G. Giglioli, The National Organisation of Irrigation, in MWEA: AN IRRIGATED RICE
SETTLEMENT IN KENYA 164 (Robert Chambers & Jon Moris eds., 1973).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 165.
138. Id. at 166.
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C. Post-Colonial Continuation of Centralized Water Governance (1963–1982)
Kenya’s independence coincided with significant changes in land use and
distribution. In preparation for the country’s independence, the colonial
government began purchasing lands from departing colons to be resold to a select
group of relatively affluent black Kenyans.139 But, largely because of the marginal
suitability of much of the land purchased through this program (which, in turn,
failed to attract the desired “progressive” black farmers) and concerns over the
growing size of the black landless population, the government ultimately
abandoned its plan for low density resettlement.140 Instead, the colonial government
used the so-called Million-Acre Scheme to redistribute approximately 1.2 million
acres of large-scale land holdings to around 35,000 families for smallholder use.141
In the decades following Kenyan independence, the country experienced a
continued increase in population and intensification in agricultural activity.142
Despite changes in land use as well as population density and distribution,
the post-independence regime largely continued the water governance approach of
its colonial predecessors. Kenya amended the 1951 Water Ordinance in 1963 and
1972, but the revisions were minimal.143 The amendments added Catchment Boards
(tasked with advising the WAB regarding water apportionment and permitting in
designated water catchments) and changed the names of Regional Water Boards144
to “Regional Water Committees.” The amendments also afforded these Committees
slightly broader, though still purely advisory, influence on the Water Resources
Authority. The 1972 Amendment appointed water bailiffs to issue permits and
monitor and sanction water usage. However, water permits still required centralized
approval. Thus, the practical effect of the 1972 amendment was to require
landholders to obtain both local and national approval to acquire a water use
permit.145
Kenya established a National Irrigation Board (NIB) in 1966, which was
tasked with the development, control, and improvement of large irrigation
settlements.146 The NIB annually allocated water to the schemes, while the precise
irrigation schedules for different water conditions were determined by scheme
managers.147 Despite the strict hierarchical system of decision making, and the
presence of formal institutions designed to sanction violations and resolve disputes,
many such mechanisms existed on paper only, and the schemes’ managers often

139. Christopher Leo, The Failure of the ‘Progressive Farmer’ in Kenya’s Million-Acre Settlement
Scheme, 16 THE J. OF MOD. AFR. STUD. 619, 621 (1978).
140. Id.
141. Christopher Leo, Who Benefited From the Million-Acre Scheme? Toward a Class Analysis of
Kenya’s Transition to Independence, 15 CAN. J. OF AFR. STUD. 201 (1981).
142. Baldwin et al., supra note 124, at 6.
143. The Water Act (1972) Cap. 372 § 24 (Kenya).
144. Along with the names of a number of other institutions referenced in the Act.
145. Baldwin et al., supra note 124, at 216.
146. Giglioli, supra note 135, at 168.
147. Baldwin et al., supra note 124, at 215.
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failed to adequately monitor water use, sanction violators, or resolve tenants’ water
conflicts, leading to widespread discontent.148
In 1974, Kenya adopted a National Water Master Plan (the “Master
Plan”), which set a target of making potable water available to all households in
Kenya by 2000.149 That same year, the Kenyan Parliament created the Ministry in
Charge of Water Affairs (the “Water Ministry”).150 In addition to taking over the
management of governmental water schemes, the Water Ministry assumed control
over self-help and County Council schemes.151 Decisions regarding water
management were to be made at the national level, with local agencies primarily
serving in an advisory capacity.152 In fact, the agencies at the catchment and district
levels lacked the needed resources to address all water governance issues that arose
at their respective levels.153 For instance, while they were supposed to be the
ground-level institutions responsible for permit issuance and enforcement, the
water bailiffs were so chronically underfunded that they often lacked the
transportation and other resources necessary to effectively undertake those
responsibilities.154 And, while local populations may have adopted their own, more
effective governance institutions, they would have been adopted in an ad hoc
fashion, outside the formal, centralized system of governance. Throughout this time
period, illegal water extraction was commonplace.155
From 1976 to 1981, Kenya conducted an analysis of the National Water
Master Plan.156 Among other things, that study (along with a later study conducted
from 1990–1992) highlighted the fact that Kenya lacked the financial resources to
achieve the Master Plan’s goals.157 This financial shortcoming particularly
hamstrung the Water Ministry’s ability to operate and maintain the water service
infrastructure under its control.158 Importantly, the Water Ministry could not
properly monitor water users for compliance with water regulations.159 As already
noted, water bailiffs (who were tasked with monitoring and enforcing compliance)
often lacked the resources necessary to even issue water permits, let alone ensure
their monitoring and enforcement.160 Compounding this shortcoming was the fact
that the unwieldy permitting process meant that the issuance of permits could take
several years.161 This combination of delayed permit issuance and ineffectual
148. See id. at 215–16.
149. REPUBLIC OF KENYA MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES, SESSIONAL PAPER NO. 1 OF 1999,
NATIONAL POLICY ON WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, at iii (1999).
150. Nyanchaga, supra note 86, at 28.
151. REPUBLIC OF KENYA MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 149, at 2; Nyanchaga,
supra note 86, at 28.
152. REPUBLIC OF KENYA MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 149, at 13–14.
153. Id. at 14.
154. Baldwin et al., supra note 124, at 216.
155. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 160–163 (discussing various factors that contributed
to the frequency of illegal extraction).
156. REPUBLIC OF KENYA MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 149, at 3.
157. See id. at 4.
158. See id. at 2–3.
159. Id. at 17.
160. Baldwin et al., supra note 124, at 216.
161. Id.

124

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 57

monitoring and enforcement meant that, in practice, water users frequently engaged
in illegal extraction.162
Other weaknesses identified by the studies included an “over-centralized
decision making process” and the absence of specialized courts or tribunals to hear
water conflicts.163 Further, and most ironically, Kenya’s water laws were
recognized as themselves impeding effective water governance in Kenya. In
addition to the Water Act, twenty-six other statutes impacted water use, greatly
complicating water governance.164 Moreover, penalties for noncompliance,
including illegal extraction, were insufficient to deter violators.165 The analyses
found that the Water Act provided little guidance on how to address conflicts
between water users.166 Those conflicts included disputes between different types
of water users (such as agricultural or industrial), between users situated in
different districts, and, most commonly, between downstream and upstream
users.167
Two widely reported examples of conflicts between upstream and
downstream users occurred in 2000. In the first, which occurred in late February of
that year, residents of a village (including the council chairman) barricaded the
Nyeri-Nyahurur highway for half a day complaining that illegal over-extraction by
upstream irrigators had prevented them from receiving any water for several
months. They demanded an audience with the area District Commissioner and
rioted when police arrived to disperse them. In the second incident, a few weeks
later, a fish farmer complained that he had lost 30,000 trout in his fish farm (worth
an estimated US$53,000) after upstream irrigators illegally diverted the Likii River.
The fish farmer threatened to take “other measures” unless the authorities
investigated and punished the illegal extractors.168 There were also numerous, and
less widely reported, forms of conflicts between upstream and downstream users,
particularly during the country’s episodic droughts. Baldwin et al. note that, faced
with an absence of legal mechanisms for redress, downstream users “would often
tamper with upstream users’ diversions or resort to other illicit forms of
retaliation.”169

162. Id.
163. REPUBLIC OF KENYA MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 149, at 13.
164. Id. at 17. For instance, the Irrigation Act, enacted in 1967, allowed the designation of any area
of land as a national irrigation scheme, after which the National Irrigation Board would be responsible
for settling people in that area and arranging for the supply of irrigation water. See Albert Mumma,
Kenya’s New Water Law: An Analysis of the Implications of Kenya’s Water Act, 2002, for the Rural
Poor, in COMMUNITY-BASED WATER LAW AND WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REFORM IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 158, 159 (Barbara van Koppen et al. eds., 2007).
165. REPUBLIC OF KENYA MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 149, at 17.
166. Id. at 17–18.
167. Id. at 17–18; Boniface P. Kiteme & John Gikonyo, Preventing & Resolving Water Use
Conflicts in the Mount Kenya Highland-Lowland System Through Water Users’ Associations, 22
MOUNTAIN RES. & DEV. 332, 334 (2002); FANUEL NYABORO, CONFLICTS OVER WATER: WHY
CONSERVATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IS KEY FOR NANYUKI WATER RESOURCE USERS ASSOCIATION 1
(SNV Nether. Dev. Org. ed., 2010).
168. Kiteme & Gikonyo, supra note 167, at 334.
169. Baldwin et al., supra note 124, at 217.

Winter 2017

THE POLYCENTRIC TURN

125

D. The Start of Decentralization of Water Management (1983–2002)
The threat of scarcity-induced water conflicts, combined with a loss of
governmental resources resulting from economic recession,170 led to local and
national initiatives to re-involve local communities in various aspects of water
management. The first of these initiatives began in 1983, with the adoption of the
District Focus for Rural Development policy (the “District Focus” policy), by
which the central Kenyan state sought to “hand over” some drinking water services
to non-governmental entities.171 Consequently, the Ministry of Water Development
emphasized the need to facilitate the formation of community-based “self-help”
groups to initiate water projects.172
In the early 1990’s, a network consisting of the Swiss-funded Laikipia
Research Programme,173 the Natural Resources Management Trust, and six Kenyan
government ministries initiated the Water Awareness Creation Campaign. This
Campaign was aimed at water stakeholders in the Upper Ewaso Ng’iro Basin, a
lowland catchment area to the northwest of Mount Kenya that encompasses
approximately 37 percent of Kenya’s land area.174 In 1997, shortly after the
conclusion of that campaign, and based on recommendations it generated, water
users adapted an existing self-help group to form the first Water User Association
(WUA). Designed to coordinate the management of water resources, mitigate
conflicts among stakeholders, and facilitate community water projects, another four
WUAs emerged by 2001.175
In 1999, The Water Ministry proposed to address the Water Act’s
shortcomings (as identified in the two National Water Master Plan analyses) by
taking the following actions (among others):



Plan and manage water resources on a drainage (rather than an
administrative) basis, creating agencies at the national, basin, and subbasin levels;176
Ensure that water legislation is regularly “reviewed, updated, rationalized,
enacted and enforced as appropriate;”177 and

170. See, e.g., REPUBLIC OF KENYA MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 149, at 49;
Wambua Sammy, WATER PRIVATIZATION IN KENYA 2 (Heinrich Boll Found., Global Issue Paper No. 8,
2004).
171. IRC INT’L WATER AND SANITATION CTR., WATER SUPPLIES MANAGED BY RURAL
COMMUNITIES 57 (1997); Elizabeth Were, Brent Swallow & Jessica Roy, Water, Women and Local
Social Organization in the Western Kenya Highlands 9 (World Agroforestry Ctr., ICRAF Working
Paper No. 12, 2006).
172. Sammy, supra note 170, at 2.
173. The Laikipia Research Programme was an interdisciplinary program between the Universities
of Nairobi and Bern. It was linked to the Kenyan Ministry of Reclamation and Development of Arid,
Semi-Arid and Wastelands, and was funded primarily by the Swiss Development Cooperation. See
Hanspeter Liniger & Francis N. Gichuki, Simulation Models as Management Tools for Sustainable Use
of Natural Resources from the Top of Mount Kenya to the Semi-Arid Lowlands iii (1994) (unpublished
manuscript), https://library.wur.nl/isric/fulltext/isricu_i11435_001.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE8D-4F8J].
174. See Kiteme & Gikonyo, supra note 167, at 332, 334–35; Liniger et al., Assessing and Managing
Scarce Tropical Mountain Water Resources, 25 MOUNTAIN RES. & DEV. 163, 163–64, 168 (2005).
175. Liniger et al., supra note 174, at 168, 170 tbl. 2; Nyaboro, supra note 167, at 1.
176. REPUBLIC OF KENYA MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 149, at 14.
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Redefine the role of the central government in water governance to
emphasize “regulatory and enabling” functions, rather than direct service
provisions, and the support of private sector and community participation
in water service provision.178

E. Polycentric Water Management (2002–Present)
Kenya revised the Water Act in 2002. In a stark departure from the
previous colonial-style approach, and consistent with the suggestions made by the
Water Ministry three years earlier, the new Water Act establishes regional-level
authorities and devolves meaningful responsibilities to them. The Act created a
Water Resources Management Authority (WRMA) tasked with, among other
things, developing principles and procedures for allocating water resources,
monitoring and assessing national water management strategy, and granting
applications for water permits and monitoring compliance with their terms.179 The
Water Act granted WRMA the legal capacity (subject to the consent of the
Attorney-General) to prosecute offenses arising under the Water Act.180 The 2002
Water Rules, promulgated pursuant to the Water Act, allowed WRMA to issue
orders requiring the cessation or undertaking of activities to ensure compliance
with the rules.181 Failure to comply with such an order can result in the imposition
of some combination of a 50,000 shilling fine, up to three months imprisonment,
and the suspension, alteration or cancellation of a water permit.182
While the Act requires the Minister to formulate a national water
management strategy,183 WRMA is tasked with formulating strategies for the use
and management of water within designated catchment areas.184 For each
catchment area, an appointed catchment area advisory committee advises WRMA
about water usage, management, and the issuance or cancellation of water
permits.185 These committees are comprised of public officials, farmers or
pastoralists, the business community, relevant non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), or others selected by WRMA based on their apparent competence in the
management of water resources.186
The Water Act mandates that WRMA “encourage and facilitate” the
establishment of WUAs, which the Act refers to by the alternate name of Water
Resources Users Associations (WRUAs).187 In order for a WRUA to be recognized
177. Id. at 18.
178. Id. at 42.
179. Water Act (2002) Cap. 372 § 7 (Kenya).
180. Id. § 8.
181. See Water Resources Management Rules (2007) Cap. 171 § 8 (Kenya).
182. Id. § 8(3).
183. See Water Act (2002) Cap. 372 § 11 (Kenya).
184. See id. § 15. Kenyan laws and policy documents use the term “basin” and “catchment” in
similar ways, although the term “catchment” has a specific legal meaning under the Act as areas defined
by WRMA “from which rainwater flows into a watercourse.” WRMA has designated six catchment
areas, as well as numerous sub-catchments. Id. §14(1).
185. See id. § 16(2).
186. See id. § 16(3).
187. Id. § 15(5).
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by WRMA under the Water Act, it must be legally registered and have a
constitution “conducive to collaborative management of the water resources of a
particular resource and which promotes public participation, conflict mitigation,
gender main-streaming and environmental sustainability.”188 Once a WRUA is
recognized, WRMA is permitted to enter into a memorandum of understanding
with it to allow for collaborative management of water.189 Even if no memorandum
of understanding is reached, however, the Water Act requires WRMA to submit a
copy of every water use application to a relevant registered WRUA for comment.190
The WRUAs are tasked with preventing and resolving user conflicts.191 To
that end, they must include all stakeholders within a catchment area and permit
them to participate in decision making.192 The legal recognition of a WRUA allows
it to assume formal governance functions such as monitoring and enforcement of
permits and the implementation of water conservation programs.193 Critically,
WRUAs are also responsible for crafting water-rationing schedules to equitably
distribute water amongst users during times of scarcity.194 While WRMA cedes
much operational control to the WRUAs, it and other government agencies are
available as needed to assist with issues of monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict
resolution.195
Facially, the new Water Act also appears to increase the jurisdiction of a
Water Appeal Board first established in 1957. In addition to allowing people to
appeal the decisions of WRMA, the Water Appeal Board is also empowered to hear
and determine water disputes.196 However, recent decisions by the Kenyan High
Court have held that the “additional jurisdiction granted to the Water Appeals (sic)
Board is in fact limited,” and is restricted to disputes regarding a “right or
proprietary interest which is directly affected by a decision or order . . . concerning
a permit or license.”197 Finally, the new Water Act also significantly increased the
penalties associated with violations of the Water Act.198 Whereas the previous
monetary penalty for violations was 5,000 shillings or imprisonment for up to three
months (for default of payment), the new penalty was 100,000 shillings,
imprisonment for up one year, or both.199
In 2010, Kenya adopted a new constitution. The constitution generally
calls for the recognition of the “right of communities to manage their own affairs
and to further their development.”200 More specifically, the constitution states that
each county should have its own government, and that each of these county
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Water Resources Management Rules (2007) Cap. 171 § 10(1) (Kenya).
See id. § 10(7).
See id. § 28(1).
See Baldwin et al., supra note 124, at 218.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Water Act (2002) Cap. 372 § 87 (Kenya).
St. Nicholas School v. Nairobi City Water & Sewage Co. (2013) 401 K.L.R. 1 (Kenya).
See Water Act (2002) Cap. 372 § 105 (Kenya).
See id.
CONSTITUTION art. 174(d) (2010) (Kenya).
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governments “shall decentralize its functions and the provision of its services to the
extent that it is efficient and practicable to do so.”201
F. Calls for Further Decentralization
Despite the sweeping changes instituted by the 2002 Water Act, Kenya
continues to grapple with how to best match its water governance approach to its
climatic and socioeconomic realities. Policymakers have recently considered—and
rejected—two draft policies that would have further devolved water governance to
regional and local decision-makers.
The Ministry for Water and Irrigation generated a draft National Water
Policy in 2012. While noting that the 2002 Water Act had facilitated greater levels
of water user participation in the form of WRAs and Water Association Groups
(WAGs), the draft policy also identified as a problem the incomplete devolution of
functions to the basin level.202 The draft policy stated that one of the guiding
policies for water resources management was that of participatory management
approaches, with the goal of facilitating conflict resolution and optimal use of the
resources.203 Similarly, from an institutional design standpoint, the draft policy
articulated the devolution of governmental functions to the lowest possible level as
a guiding principle.204
In light of the 2010 Constitution, the draft policy called for the creation of
a new Water Act.205 The draft policy emphasized the participatory rights enshrined
in the Constitution, and thus stated that the right to be informed about the status of
water management needed to be institutionalized.206 The draft policy theorizes that
such a change will help to peacefully resolve future water conflicts.207
The Kenyan Parliament considered a new draft Water Bill in both 2012
and 2014. Both drafts would have changed the language identifying water
resources as property of the state, instead describing water as being “vested in and
held by the national government in trust for the people of Kenya.”208 Both drafts
also would have established Water Sector Trust Funds to support community-level
sustainable water management initiatives.209 Both draft bills would have provided
for the designation of “basin areas,” defined as a “defined area from which
rainwater flows into a watercourse,”210 and created a basin-level management board

201. CONSTITUTION art. 176(2) (2010) (Kenya).
202. See HON. CHARITY KALUKI NGILU, MINISTRY OF WATER AND IRRIGATION, DRAFT OF THE
NATIONAL WATER POLICY (2012) § 2.1 (Kenya) (on file with author).
203. See id. § 2.2.
204. See id. § 1.5.
205. See id. § 1.1.
206. See id. § 5.4.
207. See id.
208. See NGILU, supra note 202, at § 3; The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE
SUPPLEMENT No. 27 § 5.
209. See NGILU, supra note 202, § 91(3)(a); see also The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE
SUPPLEMENT No. 27 § 112(a).
210. NGILU, supra note 202, § 11(1); The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT
No. 27 § 22(1).

Winter 2017

THE POLYCENTRIC TURN

129

or committee.211 However, the 2012 and 2014 draft bills, differed in how the basic
board or committee would be appointed. The 2012 draft bill envisioned the board
chairman and members being appointed by the cabinet secretary, in a competitive
recruitment process, from among constituents residing within the relevant basin.212
The 2014 draft called for the committee to consist of between four and seven
members appointed by the Secretary, plus two members appointed by a Council of
Governors representing the counties falling within the basin, with the Council
selecting representatives from those counties on a rotating basis.213 Additionally,
the members selected by the Secretary would have had to be residents from the
basin area, and would have included representatives from (a) a ministry dealing
with water, (b) farmers or pastoralists within the basin, (c) a public benefits
organization engaged in water management within the basin area, and (d) the
business community.214
Both draft bills called for the basin water boards to help to ensure
equitable water sharing through water allocation plans,215 but the 2012 version
would have provided the boards with significantly more power. In the 2012
version, the water boards were to receive and make decisions regarding water
permit applications, whereas in the 2014 version, the role of the board is simply to
advise the WRMA regarding such applications.216 Similarly, while both versions
call for the boards to protect water resources, only the 2012 version tasked the
boards with enforcing water regulations.217 The 2012 Draft Water Bill would have
added as one of the WRMA’s express functions the delegation of regulatory
functions to Basin Water Resources Board (the 2014 Draft Water Bill did not
contain such a requirement).218
The draft bills also would have significantly modified how violations of
and disputes under the Water Act are addressed. First, the drafts would have further
reduced the role of the court system for resolving disputes over water resources. In
an apparent response to the High Court’s interpretation of the jurisdiction of the
WRMA dispute resolution mechanism (i.e., that WRMA could only resolve cases
regarding rights under the Water Act, but not commercial disputes or other
conflicts), both drafts would have created a new Water Tribunal authorized to hear
“any dispute concerning water resources or water services where there is a business

211. See NGILU, supra note 202, § 13(1); see also The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE
SUPPLEMENT No. 27 § 23(1). The previous version of the bill used similar language to define
“catchments.” In these versions, a catchment refers to a designated area within a naturally occurring
basin. See Draft Water Bill, supra note 208, § 2(1); see also The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA
GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 27 § 2(1).
212. See NGILU, supra note 202, § 13(5).
213. See The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 27 § 24(1).
214. See The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 27 § 24(3).
215. See NGILU, supra note 202, § 14; see also The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE
SUPPLEMENT No. 27 § 25.
216. NGILU, supra note 202, § 14; The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No.
27 § 25.
217. NGILU, supra note 202, § 14; The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No.
27 § 25.
218. NGILU, supra note 202, § 9(e).
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contract, unless the parties have otherwise agreed to an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism.”219
Second, the drafts would have decentralized prosecution of water
offenses, and greatly increased the penalties associated with criminal violations of
the Water Act. The 2002 Water Act provides that the Minister, the WRMA, or the
Regulatory Board can initiate criminal proceedings.220 Both the 2012 and 2014
draft bills would have authorized licensees under the Act to initiate criminal
proceedings, and the 2014 draft bill would additionally have granted the same
authority to county government executives.221 Both versions would have increased
the penalties for offenses up to one million shillings, two years of imprisonment, or
both (compared with up to 100,000 shillings and one year of imprisonment under
the 2002 Water Act).222
IV. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED
The history of Kenya’s colonial and post-colonial water law represents an
ongoing struggle to match the country’s laws and other institutions to its
socioeconomic and environmental realities. In this section, we discuss the poor fit
of both the common law riparian doctrine and the centralized approach to water
governance in Kenya. We also discuss efforts by stakeholders to work around these
ill-suited rules and institutions through the creation of WUAs and how, through
their efforts, those users were able to help fundamentally alter the constitutional
rules affecting water extraction throughout Kenya. Finally, we discuss lessons
learned from Kenya’s experience that might be more broadly applicable to resource
governance elsewhere.
A. The Failure of the Riparian Doctrine
British colonists initially imported a governance approach that had
evolved to address a very different climate and society. In the United Kingdom,
where annual water flows hardly fluctuated and riparian owners had relatively
equal standing under the law, water governance could reasonably rely on the
judicial system to address water conflicts through the fashioning of ex post
monetary remedies and injunctions. The approach was ill-suited, however, to a
country that experienced extreme differences in precipitation between its wet and
dry seasons, lacked the resources to provide easy access to and enforcement of
judicial rulings, and had a legal system that advantaged a minority of its population
at the expense of the majority.
The ability of users under the riparian doctrine to extract nearly unlimited
amounts of water —constrained only by the requirements that the use is “ordinary”
and does not materially affect the quantity or quality of water available to
219. NGILU, supra note 202, §§ 120, 122(3); The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE
SUPPLEMENT No. 27 §§ 117(1), 119(2).
220. Water Act (2002) Cap. 372 § 15 (Kenya).
221. NGILU, supra note 202, § 118; The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT
No. 27 § 144.
222. NGILU, supra note 202, § 119; The Water Bill, No. 7 (2014), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT
No. 27 § 145.
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downstream users—relies on a core assumption that demand for water will
ordinarily not exceed availability. In order for users’ “normal” use of water to not
materially impact the whole of the remaining downstream users, the water supply
must be relatively abundant compared to aggregated demand. This scenario
occurred in the United Kingdom, where almost the entirety of the region receives
more than 600 millimeters (mm) of rain per year and where some areas receive in
annual rainfall in excess of 3,000 mm.223 Kenya, however, experiences an extreme
range of rainfall levels. Its coastal region averages between 660 and 1,194 mm/year
of rainfall, and areas near Lake Victoria receive as much as 1,930 mm/year.224 On
the other hand, 72 percent of the country receives below 508 mm of rain per year,
including some areas that receive as little as 165 mm/year.225 Thus, the assumption
of abundant water supply is simply not applicable to the vast majority of Kenya.
A second underlying assumption of the riparian doctrine is that the supply
of water will be relatively constant, such that ex post remedies are sufficient to
address disputes. In other words, the common law approach assumes little need for
flexibility in extraction rights to prospectively or concurrently address water
conflicts. Again, this fits conditions in the United Kingdom, but not Kenya. While
the United Kingdom does experience some seasonal differences in rainfall, that
difference is relatively small. Consider, for instance, the city of Oxford, which has
been operating a weather station since 1853. From that date through 2014, Oxford
received an average monthly rainfall of 60 mm, with the wettest month
(November) averaging 64mm of precipitation and the driest (February) averaging
43 mm.226
In Kenya, on the other hand, almost the entirety of rainfall occurs during
two rainy seasons (from March to May and October to December, respectively),
and even those seasons vary in their duration and rainfall levels.227 Obiero and
Onyando note, for example, that Kisumu receives a mean annual rainfall of 1,278
mm from an average of only 139 rainy days, while Lodwar experiences an annual
average of only twenty-three rainy days, resulting in a mean annual rainfall of 165
mm.228 Conditions such as those found in Kenya require flexible governance
approaches that can adapt to extreme differences in water availability, from flood
conditions to prolonged drought. The reliance on ex post remedies requires riparian
users to constantly return to the courts for redress and provides no assurance as to
the future availability of water.
Finally, the riparian doctrine is conditioned on the fact that all water users
have equal access to courts and equal standing under the law. First written in 1886,

223. UK Climate, BBC.CO.UK, http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/geography/weather_
climate/climate_rev4.shtml [https://perma.cc/3L8Z-6H2Y].
224. ROBERT M. MAXON & THOMAS P. OFCANSKY, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF KENYA 2 (3rd ed.
2014); Climate: Observations, Projections and Impacts, MET OFFICE, http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/
media/pdf/b/j/Kenya.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6TE-AS64].
225. John P.O. Obiero & Japheth O. Onyando, Climate, 16 DEVS. IN EARTH SURFACE PROCESSES
39, 41–42 (2013); See Climate: Observations, Projections and Impacts, supra note 224.
226. UK Climate-Historic Station Data, MET OFFICE, http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/public/weather/
climate-historic/#?tab=climateHistoric [https://perma.cc/Q3DM-79JB].
227. Climate: Observations, Projections and Impacts, supra note 224.
228. Obiero & Onyando, supra note 225, at 42.
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A.V. Dicey’s Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution remarked that
the “rule of law” in England was characterized by the fact that:
every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the
ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the
ordinary tribunals. In England, the idea of legal equality, or of the
universal subjection of all classes to one law administered by the
ordinary Courts, has been pushed to its utmost limit.229
Thus, at least in theory, all English landowners could expect to easily seek
redress for harm caused by upstream users, regardless of their own status and the
status of upstream extractors. Kenya, however, was marked by two clear legal
classes of riparian ownership and, hence, water users. The white colons possessed
the full ownership rights and access to the judicial system contemplated by the
riparian doctrine. Native Kenyans, on the other hand, were stripped of individual
ownership rights; ownership was held in trust by the Kenyan state. In order to seek
redress, native water users had to ask the government to seek action on their behalf.
Before 1935, when the Water Board was tasked with protecting the reserves’ water
rights, it was unclear to which entity within the colonial government native
Kenyans could turn to for redress. Even after 1935, it is likely that residents of the
native reserves faced significant economic, logistical, and administrative hurdles to
seeking the resolution of water disputes—if they were even aware of the Water
Board’s fiduciary obligations. In short, while white colons might possess the
relative legal equality required by the riparian doctrine, the diminished legal rights
of native Kenyans meant that, for all intents and purposes, the doctrine provided
them with little or no protection.
B. The Failure of Centralized Governance
By consolidating and centralizing water governance, the colonial and postcolonial governments sought to address the riparian doctrine’s glaring
shortcomings. Rather than allowing the ambiguous “ordinary use” of water, so long
as that use did not interfere with the rights of downstream users, the governments
sought to restrict water use at the individual level through the issuance of permits.
In place of ex post judicial remedies, the state sought to ensure individual
compliance by sanctioning permit violators. The governments attempted to address
fluctuations in water availability by authorizing water bailiffs to amend permissible
rates of extraction in order to ensure an equitable distribution of water resources.
The reliance on permits, however, had several fundamental flaws. First, a
centralized permitting system is highly resource intensive. In order to implement a
successful monocentric system such as the one implemented in Kenya, the state
must: (1) investigate the reasonableness of a permit application by assessing the
geological and climatic conditions of the water resource at issue, including the
existing and future demands on that resource from other users, (2) engage in
ongoing monitoring of resource users to ensure compliance with permits and take
measures to punish violators, and (3) undertake an ongoing assessment of water
229. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 181 (3rd ed.
1889).
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conditions and extraction in order to determine whether to amend the permit
holders’ respective rates of extraction. The combination of these responsibilities
demanded manpower and money that neither the colonial nor post-independence
governments possessed.
Second, by legally establishing invariable extraction entitlements (subject
only to the possibility of emergency alteration by a central authority), the permit
system retarded the capacity of local users to engage in local collective action to
address changes in water availability or constructively resolve user disputes.
Upstream users were legally entitled to extract their full permitted amount, even in
times of scarcity. Downstream users had no legal avenues that could provide timely
redress during water scarcity, and the permit program that ought to have protected
their interests was in disarray, as state officials lacked the resources to effectively
enforce permit terms.230 As a consequence, downstream users often suffered
chronic water shortages and resorted to self-help measures ranging from peaceful
self-organization to mass protests, riots, and sabotage.
Third, Kenya’s use of a centralized permitting system precluded the state
from accounting for local needs and conditions. Kenya experiences extreme
seasonal and year-to-year fluctuations in precipitation, and its water stakeholders
range from large, commercial agricultural estates to nomadic pastoralists. Thus,
each water catchment in Kenya has its own unique assortment of users with their
own particular needs, and both these users and their respective needs can differ
from season to season and from year to year. Kenya’s system of permitting simply
lacked the flexibility to account for this sort of variation between and within user
groups.
In sum, the use of water permits resulted in an unwieldy system that
lacked the ability to gauge the appropriateness of permit requests, ensure permit
compliance, resolve disputes arising from conflicting permits, or respond in a
timely fashion to changes in demand or environmental conditions. These were not
lacunae, but rather gaping holes in a system that facilitated extractions by mostly
white upstream landowners and greatly diminished the ability of the largely black
downstream users to meet their own needs. The inequities in the system, in turn,
incentivized disadvantaged stakeholders to engage in extra-legal self-help
measures.
C.

The Polycentric Reshaping of Water Law to Allow for Flexible
Governance and Experimentation

While the poor fit between a monocentric approach and Kenya’s
geographic, political, economic conditions led to the failure of centralized water
governance, that same mismatch also provided the opening for localized
stakeholders to experiment with more appropriate governance arrangements. These
early experiments were facilitated, in turn, by government agencies, which had a
similar interest in fashioning a more effective governance system. Early efforts to
reform Kenya’s centralized system of water governance came from local
stakeholders interacting with and supported by a number of other players with
varying and overlapping goals and jurisdictions.
230. Baldwin et al., supra note 124, at 11.
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The WUAs were a direct result of those early local reform efforts. From a
formal legal standpoint, they were merely voluntary governance associations, but
the WUAs gained the tacit support of multiple government agencies so that they
could make their own local governance arrangements unimpeded. As a result, the
WUAs became a viable alternative water governance system that overlapped and
worked in concert with the state’s formal rules and institutions. In other words,
they represented the beginning of a new, polycentric approach to water governance.
Critical to the success of the WUAs was the fact that all stakeholders had
at least a potential interest in tailoring water governance to local conditions. Under
the monocentric approach, upstream users often had the de facto ability to extract
as much water as they desired. But, this ability could come with political costs,
including the risk of provoking aggressive responses from downstream users, who
correctly surmised that the government could not adequately protect their interests.
As a consequence, both upstream and downstream users faced incentives to craft a
system of governance that would protect all users’ interests.231
In practice, the early WUAs demonstrated the capacity to adopt, monitor,
enforce, and mediate a much more flexible set of rules than those set out in existing
legislation. In 2002, the same year that the revised Water Act institutionalized the
WUA approach, Kiteme and Gikonyo reviewed the performance of five preexisting
WUAs located in the Ewaso Ngiro North Basin.232 The authors found that the
WUAs had adopted a seasonally-based extraction schedule, with varying degrees
of limitations on water extraction during the dry months.233 Additionally, while the
WUAs generally met on a quarterly basis, they would also conduct special
meetings if events required immediate attention.234 Unlike under the monocentric
approach, the WUAs used their own monitors to ensure compliance with water
extraction rules, and the WUAs’ Executive Boards (composed of representatives
from various stakeholder groups) would attempt to mediate and collaboratively
resolve the inevitable user conflicts.235 These arrangements sharply contrasted the
formal legal system’s reliance on fixed extraction levels (amended only after
inequitable circumstances necessitated the appointment of a water bailiff) and
centralized monitoring and enforcement of water of water permits.
The success of these early WUAs in experimenting with more flexible
local water policies led to the expansion of their roles, in some cases, to include
other aspects of resource management.236 In addition to governing water extraction,
WUAs began addressing concerns regarding water pollution and riparian
degradation by engaging in education and awareness campaigns, undertaking
reforestation of riparian areas, and introducing agricultural best practices.237 Some
of the WUAs also started assisting their members in other ways, such as helping

231. In fact, Liniger et al. note that large-scale upstream horticultural firms co-founded six of the
first 13 WUAs and participated in another two. Liniger et al., supra note 174, at 168.
232. Kiteme & Gikonyo, supra note 167, at 335.
233. Id. at 336.
234. Id. at 335.
235. Id. at 336.
236. Id. at 337.
237. Id.; Liniger et al., supra note 174, at 169.
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them to develop supplemental water supplies or diversify their income sources.238
Kiteme and Gikonyo suggest that some of these developments may have been the
result of communication and information exchange between various WUAs.239
Thus, it appears that this early network of WUAs realized in practice the potential
of polycentric systems to facilitate the rapid adoption sharing of successful
innovations amongst horizontally situated decision centers.
Innovation swapping also occurred between vertically situated governance
units, as the WUAs’ successful innovations ultimately led to an amendment of the
entire national approach to water governance in the 2002 Water Act. That statute
formally recognized the legitimacy of the WUAs (now described as WRUAs), and
sought to facilitate that approach throughout the rest of Kenya. By now, more than
400 WRUAs have been formally recognized, and more than half of those have
formalized management plans with the WRMA, which allow them to
collaboratively manage water resources.240 In this respect, we can see how a
polycentric system of governance can allow for local experimentation that, if
successful, can be scaled up and, if unsuccessful, does not threaten the integrity of
the system as a whole.
In this discussion of polycentricity, it is important to distinguish between
polycentric and decentralized systems. While Kenya’s water reforms devolved
significant decision-making authority from central water agency officials to local
WRUAs, this does not imply complete decentralization or an absence of national
authority. In fact, national water regulators are responsible for establishing
national-scale water policy, coordinating between WRUAs, working with
individual WRUAs on water conservation activities, and providing back-up
systems for governance functions such as monitoring and conflict resolution on an
as-needed basis when the WRUAs are unable to undertake these activities on their
own. Polycentric systems are both horizontal (allowing local WRUAs to undertake
water governance activities) and vertical (providing for coordination between local
and national actors).
D. Lessons from the Kenyan Experience
Given the particularized climatic, racial, and socio-economic challenges
faced by its agriculture, what broader lessons can be drawn from Kenya’s
experimentations in water governance? More than might, at first blush, be
supposed.
First, water scarcity and seasonal variation in water availability are not
unique to Kenya. Countries throughout the developed and developing worlds must
contend with competition over water supplies. Further, the intensity and nature of
that competition is likely to vary across seasons and geographic regions within

238. Kiteme & Gikonyo, supra note 167, at 337.
239. When writing of the fact that two WUAs had initiated external fundraising to support the
creation of alternate sources of income and water, the authors wrote “[o]ther [WUAs] will certainly
follow this good example.” Id.
240. Jampel Dell’Angelo et al., Multilevel Governance of Irrigation Systems and Adaptation to
Climate Change in Kenya, in THE GLOBAL WATER SYSTEM IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 323, 330 (A.
Bhaduri et al. eds., 2014).
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those countries. Therefore, states must adopt a governance approach that provides
the adaptability and responsiveness to balance the competing (and changing) needs
of water users and to timely address inevitable user disputes. Monolithic
governance regimes are likely to lack the capacity to provide this sort of flexibility
and alacrity. A polycentric system of governance, on the other hand, allows for
more local decision-making, the possibility of innovation tailored to local
conditions, and more rapid responses to changing local conditions.
Second, despite its chaotic appearance, polycentricity can actually
facilitate effective governance by allowing for coordination and knowledge
exchange between different units and layers of governance.241 Policymakers in a
centralized governance system often have difficulty gathering information that
would allow for the generation of policies suited to a diversity of regional needs.242
They are reliant on the timely provision of information from regional and local
agencies and, therefore, vulnerable to both inefficiencies in the exchange of
information and the strategic manipulation of information by local and regional
actors. In contrast, a polycentric system of governance allows for more rapid
exchange of ideas and adoption of successful innovations.
Network theory provides an important insight into the capacity of
polycentric systems to facilitate this type of knowledge exchange. The overlap in
jurisdiction amongst decision-making centers in a polycentric system allows the
centers to directly influence each other, and for individual actors to be
simultaneously involved in multiple centers.243 Consequently, decision centers in a
polycentric regime are linked together via mutual influence and commonality of
actors into a broader governance network.244
In discussing the impact of networking among firms, Mahmood and Rufin
observe that knowledge “spills over” organizational boundaries.245 They write,
[a] growing body of research on networks suggests that the
potential for firms to internalize such cross-boundary spillovers is
particularly high within networks. . . . Within a cluster [of firms],
exchanges of ideas among firms may occur through formal ties or
through informal ties, since individuals from different firms often
interact in various social settings. . . . Networks provide multiple
points of contact across their members and, thus, greater
opportunities for open-ended relationships and random learning
than those found in strictly planned environments, where
relationships are much more rigidly predefined and
circumscribed to a specific type of exchange.246

241. The literature suggests that effective governance systems facilitate coordination within and
between different levels of decision making. See Baldwin et al., supra note 124, at 3.
242. See Wei Cui & Zhiyuan Wang, The Inefficiencies of Legislative Centralization: Evidence from
Provincial Tax Rate-Setting, 13 CHINA: AN INT’L J. 47, 48 (2015).
243. Michael D. McGinnis, Networks of Adjacent Action Situations in Polycentric Governance, 31
POL’Y STUD. J. 51, 52, 58 (2011).
244. Id. at 52.
245. Ishtiaq P. Mahmood & Carlos Rufin, Government’s Dilemma: The Role of Government in
Imitation and Innovation, 30 ACAD. OF MGMT. REVIEW 338, 343 (2005).
246. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Given the frequent interactions amongst decision centers in a polycentric
regime, and the potential involvement of actors in multiple centers, Mahmood and
Rufin’s observations about the advantages of networks to firms would appear to be
equally applicable to state governance. All else being equal, we would expect more
opportunities for learning and the adoption of innovation in a polycentric system of
governance than we would in a rigidly hierarchical governance system.
Third, a polycentric system of governance is better equipped to recognize
and incorporate local, informal institutions. Nations in all stages of development,
and of all degrees of centralization, have a plenitude of informal institutions that
contribute to governance and the provision of public goods, including issues
involving agricultural water use. The global marketplace, for example, is rife with
voluntary certification programs through which sellers signal eco-friendly
practices. In the United States, the Food Alliance, for example, offers a
sustainability certification to crop producers that meet the organization’s standards
on a number of issues, including soil and water conservation.247 After the issuance
of the certification, the organization reserves the right to audit certificate holders to
ensure continued compliance.248 In this way, the Food Alliance informally
performs a governance role amongst those who have obtained certification.
In many developing countries, the limitations of the central state often
result in the development of informal institutions by local communities to more
expressly assume governmental responsibilities. Communities can and frequently
do create and enforce their own resource extraction rules. In addition to the
WRUAs in Kenya, for example, traditional authorities in some areas of Namibia
retained a role in granting access to water and regulating its use throughout a
succession of colonial governments.249 Similarly, despite the fact that agricultural
systems in India are formally government controlled, in reality “informal
institutional arrangements rul[e] the roost.”250
A polycentric governance approach provides a greater opportunity for the
integration of these informal institutions into the broader governance system. In
this way, rather than operating in the absence of or in spite of the formal governing
hierarchy, organizations created by informal institutions can become part of the
network of overlapping decision centers in a broader polity. As a consequence, a
polycentric governance system has the potential to improve both efficiency (as
might be the case where industry voluntarily self-regulates) and effectiveness, as in
the case of Kenya’s WRUAs.

247. Interestingly, the Food Alliance itself formed as the result of an inter-jurisdictional
collaboration between Oregon State University, Washington State University, and the Washington State
Department of Agriculture. See generally Food Alliance Producer Certification Program Standards and
Procedures Manual, FOOD ALLIANCE, http://fadocsstyle.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
2013-FA-Producer-StandardsProcedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8MZ-WWNJ].
248. Id.
249. Thomas Falk, Bernadette Bock & Michael Kirk, Polycentrism and Poverty: Experiences of
Rural Water Supply Reform in Namibia, 2 WATER ALTERNATIVES 115, 119 (2009).
250. Tushaar Shah & Barbara van Koppen, Is India Ripe for Integrated Water Resources
Management? Fitting Water Policy to National Development Context, 41 ECON. & POLITICAL WEEKLY
3413, 3416 (2006).

